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Abstract  
This article responds to a recent contribution to this journal. Procter and Radnor (2014) provide an 
account of teamworking in the UK Ciǀil “eƌǀiĐe, speĐifiĐallǇ Heƌ MajestǇ͛s ‘eǀeŶue aŶd Custoŵs 
(HMRC), which focuses on the relationship between recently implemented lean work organisation 
and teams and teamworking. This intervention is prompted by criticism of the present authors͛ 
published research into lean in the same locus (e.g. Carter et al, 2011a; 2011b; 2013a;2013b). 
Procter and Radnor claim, without foundation we argue, that ouƌ ǁoƌk is ͚oŶe-sided͛ aŶd that theiƌs 
deliǀeƌs a ͚ŵoƌe ŶuaŶĐed͛ analysis of lean in this government department - and it follows - of the 
lean phenomenon more generally. Our riposte critiques their article on several grounds. Firstly, it 
suffers from problems of logic and construction, conceptual confusion and definitional imprecision. 
Methodological difficulties and inconsistent evidence contribute additionally to analytical weakness. 
Included in our response are empirical findings on teamworking at HMRC, which challenge Procter 
aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s eǀideŶtial ďasis aŶd further reveal the shortcomings of their interpretation.   
Keywords 
Lean, lean working, teams, teamworking, targets, new public management, HMRC 
Introduction 
At the outset of this riposte to Procter aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ƌeĐeŶt aƌtiĐle oŶ teams, teamworking 
and lean in the UK Civil Service, which criticises the pƌeseŶt authoƌs͛ ǁoƌk ;e.g. Caƌteƌ et al, ϮϬϭϭa;ď; 
2013a;b), it is important to provide some necessary contextualisation that locates our respective 
positions. The last decade has seen concerted efforts to transpose the principles of lean work 
organisation from manufacturing (Womack et al, 1990) to servicing and clerical work, particularly in 
the public sector. The justification for this diffusion has been the claim ŵade ďǇ leaŶ͛s advocates of 
its ability to deliver significant efficiency savings and improvements in service quality in the contexts 
of the economies of ͚best value͛ aŶd, since 2010, of the ͚ConDem͛ UK ĐoalitioŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt austerity 
programme. IŶ “eddoŶ͛s ǁoƌds ;ϮϬϭϮͿ, lean has seemed to be ͚aŶ aŶsǁeƌ fƌoŵ heaǀeŶ͛, a silǀeƌ 
bullet promising cost cutting, tightened task cycle times and reduced staffing levels without 
jeopardising - perhaps even enhancing - the customer experience.  
The salience of the political-economic context surrounding and driving what Procter and Radnor 
term ͚seĐoŶd-ǁaǀe LeaŶ iŶ the UK͛ (Procter and Radnor, 2014: 2981) is understated in their account 
of developments in Heƌ MajestǇ͛s ‘eǀeŶue aŶd Custoŵs ;HMRC), the common locus of research that 
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forms the basis of contestation between us.  In their version, lean is assumed to be a superior 
organisational methodology and practice in both rational-technicist and normative senses, 
assumptions that we challenge. They ascribe insufficient explanatory power to the imperatives of 
tight budgets and new public management that drove its adoption
i
, so that lean is presented as an 
autonomous set of practices and principles divorced not only from political-economic contexts and 
employment relations but also from the dynamics of a conflictual employment relationship.    
WoŵaĐk aŶd JoŶes͛ ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ĐoŶteŶtioŶ that lean had universal applicability, and was not confinable 
to manufacturing, proved influential. LeaŶ͛s promise ͚not just to do more for less, but ďetteƌ foƌ less͛ 
(Radnor and Bucci, 2010) constituted its essential attractiveness, fuelling a growing acceptance by 
government and senior public sector management of leaŶ͛s appliĐaďilitǇ. Popularisers of lean 
distilled its purchase to five core ͚principles͛ (relating to value and value streams, continuous flow 
and cycle times) which further helped to spawn management how-to toolkits (e.g. George et al, 
2004)
ii
. Increasingly, such practical guides focused on service work (Bicheno, 2008). Simplification of 
this kind was antithetical to the Toyota Production System (Seddon, 2005) and to the holistic nature 
of systems thinking, but it provided the means by which lean became widely implemented, at least 
in name, in clerical, service and even technical and professional work from the early-to-mid 2000s. 
Thus, the increased receptiveness of public sector management to hitherto neglected lean 
͚ŵethodologies͛ ŵeshed ǁith uƌgeŶt goǀeƌŶŵeŶtal ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts for financial retrenchment. At this 
juncture academics realised the opportunity for consultancy projects as public sector bodies either 
considered or had recently implemented forms of lean working. Prominent among these was one of 
the co-authors of the article to which we are responding. Under the auspices of the AtoZ Business 
Consultancy, Radnor pursued a series of consultancies, including  the Scottish Government (2006), 
HMRC (Radnor and Bucci, 2007) and the Association of Business Schools (Radnor and Bucci, 2010) 
and, drawing on data from their reports, published widely in academic journals (e.g. Radnor and 
Boaden, 2008; Radnor and Walley, 2008; Radnor et al, 2012).  
While academic studies based on findings from consulting projects are not in principle problematic, 
such work is susceptible to bias towards managerial preoccupations or problems of data selectivity 
and interpretation, difficulties which, we argue, are manifest in Procter and Radnoƌ͛s article (2014). 
In the interests of balance and transparency, we explicate our own research methods and potential 
limitations, acknowledging the role of the Public Commercial and Services (PCS) trade union, which 
provided us with access and for whom we completed a research report (Carter et al, 2009). 
However, our critique of Procter and Radnor is based on more than epistemological and 
methodological difference.  We contend that Procter aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ aƌguŵeŶt is bedevilled by 
problems of logic and construction, conceptual confusion and definitional imprecision. Having 
neglected to consider in their literature review some of the more uncomfortable truths about lean 
and teamworking, analytical weakness is compounded by difficulties of method, data gathering and 
inconsistent evidence. In responding to Procter and ‘adŶoƌ͛s criticism of our research, we draw on 
our own empirical findings on teamworking and lean at HMRC, which both challenge their evidential 
basis and reveal the shortcomings of their broader interpretation.  
Problems of Logic, Definition and Missing Literature 
Procter and Radnor (2014: 2979) pose four questions on teamworking and lean production that they 
claim their article ͚addresses͛. The first appears, on the surface at least, to be a matter of clumsy 
expression, but a close reading of their paper suggests that it is much more than an unfortunate 
formulation. Indeed, because of the significant conceptual, methodological and empirical issues 
raised by the question it is worth quoting it in full: ͚GiǀeŶ the stated iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of teaŵǁoƌkiŶg iŶ 
lean production, what would we expect teams to look like as part of the contemporary application of 
LeaŶ thiŶkiŶg?͛. In the following sections headed ͚LeaŶ, leaŶ teaŵs aŶd teaŵǁoƌkiŶg͛ (ibid: 2979-
83), the authors͛ use of the ĐoŶditioŶal ďeĐoŵes Đleaƌ. TheǇ posit the Ŷeed to uŶdeƌstaŶd ǁhat ͚that 
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[lean] team might look like͛ ;iďid: ϮϵϳϵͿ ďǇ ƌefeƌeŶĐe to teams in the writings of the innovators of 
the term ͚leaŶ͛ (Womack et al.,1990: 99) and of the founder of the Toyota Production System (Ohno, 
1988)
iii
. It is valid methodologically, indeed desirable, to identify the original propositions on lean 
and teamworking and to subject them to empirical scrutiny in contemporary contexts. Evaluating the 
extent to which, and the reasons why, current managerial practice might depart from founding 
principles is important. What is problematic, though, is their construction of this (expected) version 
of teamworking under lean for the purpose of interrogating contemporary developments, while 
disregarding an established body of knowledge on lean and teamworking. Why posit such a 
conditional question, when hard eǀideŶĐe of leaŶ͛s ͚ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ appliĐatioŶ͛ lies at hand, 
supported by over 20 years of research? A more meaningful hypothesis would have been 
constructed around existing knowledge rather than the speculative counterfactual
iv
.  
Procter and Radnor (2014) neglect a body of largely well-known critical work on lean (e.g. Danford, 
1998; 1999; Delbridge, 1998; Landsbergis et al, 1999; Lewchuck and Robertson, 1997; Mehri, 2006; 
Sprigg and Jackson, 2006; Sprigg et al, 2007; Stewart et al, 2009)
v
. This omission may be less a breach 
of academic protocol and more a matter of avoiding uncomfortable evidence. Procter and Radnor 
imply that the ͚laďouƌ pƌoĐess͛ peƌspeĐtiǀe ͚uŶdeƌpiŶŶiŶg this [Caƌteƌ et al͛s] ĐoŶĐlusioŶ͛ (ibid: 2982) 
has dictated the nature of our evidence, specifiĐallǇ uŶadulteƌated TaǇloƌisŵ͛. “uĐh aŶ inference 
that questions our methodological rigour and research ethics is untenable. Our studies do not 
constitute some kind of mechanical, ideologically dƌiǀeŶ, laďouƌ pƌoĐess outlieƌ that staŶds ͚iŶ 
ĐoŶtƌast to͛ all otheƌ studies ;iďid: ϮϵϴϮͿ. ‘atheƌ ouƌ eǀideŶĐe of leaŶ aŶd its effeĐts oŶ eŵploǇees is 
consistent with a well-established body of critical work. While certain expectations were inevitably 
informed by a reading of the critical literature, our approach was essentially inductive, to let the 
findings speak for themselves and, through a process of iteration, drawing conclusions that 
developed the conceptual frameworks most appropriate for explaining the phenomenon in 
question.  
The following synthesis of this work demonstrates engagement with this work and shows also how 
its absence renders Procter aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s aĐĐouŶt, and not ours, one-sided. In the conventional 
wisdom of lean, the team is accorded the status of ͚uŶiƋue oƌgaŶisatioŶal foƌŵ͛ ;WoŵaĐk el al, 
1990). However, rather than becoming the locus of multi-skilling, job rotation, task enlargement and 
worker decision-making, the critical literature shows lean teams as exhibiting tighter supervisory 
surveillance and control, narrow tasking, detailed work and harsh targeting and highly circumscribed 
(if any) meaningful eŵploǇee ͚ǀoiĐe͛ aŶd participation in decision-making. Instead of the ͚Đƌeatiǀe 
stƌess͛, by which lean was meant to empower workers and to improve productivity, studies 
discovered heighted labour subordination, greater job strain and stress, physical and mental ill-
health and systemic managerial bullying.  
While many of these critical studies centred on manufacturing environments, some (e.g. Baldry et al, 
1998: Sprigg and Jackson, 2006; Sprigg et al, 2007) produced similar findings from clerical or service 
work. “pƌigg aŶd JaĐksoŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ suĐĐiŶĐt ǀeƌdiĐt from their research into call centres ǁas that ͚the 
leaner the call ĐeŶtƌe, the ŵeaŶeƌ it ǁill ďe͛. Without imputing motive, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the omission of this critical literature helps to explain the convoluted logic of the first 
hypothetical-conditional question. Missing two decades of critical research enables lean to be 
presented in a better light ͚iŶ pƌiŶĐiple͛ while ignoring uncomfortable truths revealed of lean in 
practice. The ͚pƌioƌ eǆpeĐtatioŶs͛, to which Procter and Radnor (2014: 2979) refer in their third 
question, should have been imbued with this critical evidence. 
Procter aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s treatment of teamworking is also deficient. Admittedly, they recognise that a 
central problem with teamworking might lie in reconciling the discretion exercised by workers in 
autonomous work groups (AWGs) with the tight continuous production flows associated with J-I-T 
(Just-in-Time) and lean. TheǇ Đite BeŶdeƌs aŶd ǀaŶ Hootegeŵ͛s ;ϭϵϵϵͿ ideŶtifiĐatioŶ of the ͚issue of 
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autoŶoŵǇ͛ ďut, beyond this acknowledgement, their discussion frequently confuses rather than 
clarifies and their usage of teamworking lacks definitional purpose.  For instance, their treatment of 
teams in the health service (e.g. Finn et al, 2010) is largely descriptive, and while they echo its calls 
for greater clarity in definition (op cit, 2982) they do not provide it. Such imprecision is perhaps 
surprising given one of the co-authoƌ͛s iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ an influential edited collection on 
teamworking (Procter and Mueller, 2000).  
It is necessary to distinguish the traditions and variants of teamworking have been incorporated into 
managerial perspectives. Organic or naturally occurring groups or gangs (informal workgroups) were 
͚ƌedisĐoǀeƌed͛ ďǇ the HuŵaŶ ‘elatioŶs ŵoǀeŵeŶt duƌiŶg the ϭϵϮϬs aŶd were promoted by the 
Tavistock Institute as AWGs. In turn, AWGs were appropriated by the Socio-Technical school in the 
1950s, particularly in Scandinavia (e.g. Sandberg, 1993). In the 1980s, teamworking was rediscovered 
with new labels and was tied to the claiŵ that oƌgaŶisatioŶs͛ eĐoŶoŵiĐ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe was dependant 
oŶ ͚Đoŵŵitted, fleǆiďle, ŵulti-skilled, constantly retrained people, joined together in self-managing 
teams (Peters, 1987). In sum, the naturally occurring work group differs significantly from 
teamworking that is consciously utilised, or initiated, by management. The two main traditions of 
the latter are the socio-technical and the more recent Japanese forms. In the first, management 
attempts to harness the naturally-occurring collectivities, while in the second the team is 
constructed ͚from above͛ and is assoĐiated ǁith ͚leaŶ pƌoduĐtioŶ͛, J-I-T and kaizen. Procter and 
Muller (2000) argue that these two traditions have come together, but the evidence from the 
literature suggests that the latter dominates and the socio-technical tradition is more claim than 
reality.  
The conflation of these traditions and forms of teamworking present Proctor and Radnor with an 
underlying theoretical problem. Referencing Vidal (2007), they use the terms ͚eŵpoǁeƌŵeŶt͛ aŶd 
͚autoŶoŵǇ͛ ;op cit: 2980; 2992) interchangeably, as if they were conceptually and substantively the 
same. Genuine autonomy is the outcome of inherent properties of group work, in which 
collectivities are able to exercise significant degrees of control over decision-making. In contrast, 
empowerment, a classic term in the unitarist HRM lexicon, gives to workers, operating within strict 
parameters at the very fringes of managerial power, a sense of decision-making at the level of 
immediate task performance (see Ramsay, 1996). The analytical precision that Marchington (2000) 
called for, and which is essential for cutting through the ambiguities and elasticity of the term 
͚teamworking͛, is missing from their account. Employing rigorous criteria, including degree of self-
management, scope of activities, extent of polyvalent activity, member interdependence and so on 
(see Buchanan and McCalman, 1989 for an early example) would have proved beneficial. 
Instead, Procter and Radnor propose a ͚foƌŵ of indirect autoŶoŵǇ͛ as a ͚main defining characteristic 
of the leaŶ teaŵ͛ ;op Đit: Ϯϵϴ0), one that is ͚effective through the responsibility that employees have 
for shaping SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures)͛. This indirect autonomy does not come close to 
even a diluted form of the socio-technically inspired team, yet by a tortuous logic, these lean teams 
are held to ĐoŶstitute ͚a different kiŶd of autoŶoŵǇ͛. The ďasis foƌ this Đlaiŵed ͚iŶdiƌeĐt autoŶoŵǇ͛ 
lies in worker responses to centrally imposed SOPs rather than to any worker involvement in their 
formulation (ibid: 2988-90). Numerous studies have demonstrated the strict constraints imposed by 
SOPs on team members (Parker and Slaughter, 1988; Delbridge et al, 2000) and evidence from 
manufacturing shows the deleterious consequences for workers (Danford, 1999; Lewchuk and 
Roberston, 1997: Mehri; 2006; Stewart et al, 2009). It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the 
life ƌaft of ͚iŶdiƌeĐt autoŶoŵǇ͛ that Procter and Radnor use to ƌesĐue ͚autoŶoŵǇ͛ is full of holes. The 
evidence section (op cit: 2988-2990), discussed below, contains little other than team and individual 
team member compliance to tightly prescribed protocols, consistent with the evidence of Carter et 
al (2009). No suppoƌt foƌ the ŶotioŶ of the ͚iŶdiƌeĐt autoŶoŵǇ͛ iŶ the secondary literature is adduced 
other than that by Procter and Currie (2004).  
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As if conceding that this ŵuddled ŶotioŶ of ͚iŶdiƌeĐt autoŶoŵǇ͛ fails to denote autonomy in any 
meaningful sense, Procter and Radnor return to studies of teaŵǁoƌk iŶ H‘MC͛s pƌedeĐessoƌ, the 
Inland Revenue (IR). Their second rescue attempt seeks to construct some notion of autonomy 
around ͚target-based teamworking [which] can be seen as being reliant on outcome 
interdependence͛ (Procter and Currie, 2004: 1567). Notwithstanding individual case workingvi and 
appraisals which run counter to teamworking principles, the authors claim employees identify with 
teamworking ͚ďased oŶ theiƌ teaŵ͛s goal oƌ taƌget output͛ ;iďid; ϭϱϲϳͿ. Now, the importance of 
team targets in the UK civil service have long been recognised (e.g. Baldry et al, 1998), but such 
research is neglected by Procter and Radnor. It depicts team targets as being the aggregate of 
ǁoƌkeƌs͛ iŶdiǀidual taƌgets based on task individualism and work intensification, which do not 
engender even normative or cultural attributes of teamworking. The routine white collar work 
represented by Baldry et al (1998) developed under the pressure of efficiency imperatives and the 
͚Teaŵ Taylorism͛ of fragmented, detailed tasks subjected to tight control and surveillance strikingly 
resembles the realities of teamworking at HMRC.  
We do agree with Procter and Radnor that teams at HM‘C aƌe Ŷot ͚pseudo teaŵs͛, in that they are 
not merely cosmetic, although Procter and Radnor (2014) do make a surprising confession given the 
overall tenor of their argument when they state that ͚foƌ soŵe [in HMRC] the operations of the 
teaŵs ǁeƌe Ŷot seeŶ as aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt issue…a teaŵ ǁas little ŵoƌe thaŶ ŶoŵiŶal͛ (2014: 2990). 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, ƌatheƌ thaŶ tƌǇiŶg to ĐoŶstƌuĐt a Đase ƌouŶd ͚iŶdiƌeĐt autoŶoŵǇ͛ oƌ engaging in the fallacy 
that team-based targets generate a tangible sense of collective teamworking, it may have been 
more fruitful had they acknowledged or, better still, ǁoƌked ǁith the ĐoŶĐept of ͚teaŵs ǁithout 
teaŵǁoƌkiŶg͛. The ǁoƌk of ǀaŶ deŶ Bƌoek et al (2004) on teamworking in call centres is instructive. 
Utilising a model that comprises three dimensions of teamworking – technical, governance and 
normative – vaŶ deŶ Bƌoek et al fouŶd that teaŵ stƌuĐtuƌes ǁeƌe ĐoŶstƌuĐted iŶ teƌŵs of ͚spaŶs of 
ĐoŶtƌol͛. With self-goǀeƌŶaŶĐe alŵost eŶtiƌelǇ aďseŶt ͚teaŵǁoƌkiŶg did Ŷot eǆist iŶ aŶǇ suďstaŶtiǀe 
oƌ tƌaditioŶal seŶse͛ (2004: 211). Teams do have a managerial purpose as mechanisms of 
administrative control, dividing up large workforces, enabling effective supervision and monitoring 
and facilitating cultural and normative goals. In this account, team leaders or front line managers are 
perhaps more important than the teams themselves. Importantly, teams exist also as organisational 
entities designed to engender the internalisation of corporate values, an objective that has palpably 
failed at HMRC.  
Methodology and Methods 
Underlying methodological problems stem from the original consulting project. Radnor and Bucci 
(2007) were commissioned through their AtoZ Consultancy by HMRC to provide an evaluation of the 
Pacesetter programme as the centrepiece of the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ageŶĐǇ͛s leaŶ pƌojeĐt. Thƌoughout this 
and other reports (e.g. Radnor et al, 2006; Radnor and Bucci, 2010), the authors insist that they 
pƌoǀide aŶ ͚iŶdepeŶdeŶt assessŵeŶt͛ of ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛s leaŶ initiatives. Yet the degree of 
independence is open to question.   
The ͚IŶteƌǀieǁ outliŶe/sĐhedule foƌ FoĐus Gƌoups͛ used in the HMRC study (Radnor and Bucci, 2007: 
85) contains a preamble laden with normative assumptions, making reference to ͚effiĐieŶĐǇ 
iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt ŵethodologies͛, aŶd pƌesĐƌiptiǀe iŶteŶt, that theiƌ ǁoƌk ĐaŶ eŶaďle HM‘C ͚to ĐoŶtiŶue 
to make informed decisions and responses about the development and use of Lean and Operational 
Management/Senior Leadership͛. Moƌe ďlataŶtlǇ, theǇ state that theǇ aƌe ͚espeĐiallǇ interested in 
understanding how the [lean] methodology used has improved (our emphasis) your working 
environment and processes as well as the sustainability of these iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs͛. Fƌaŵed iŶ this 
manner, only positive contributions are solicited at the expense of balanced questions that might 
prompt the reporting of negative experiences
vii
. Of greater concern, though, regarding the 
potentially compromised independence of the study is the admission that their final evaluation 
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ƌepoƌt ͚ǁas ǀalidated ďǇ seŶioƌ HM‘C peƌsoŶŶel͛ ;PƌoĐteƌ aŶd ‘adŶor, 2014: 2987). Perhaps in 
anticipation of such criticism, they draw the distinction between the report and the paper but, since 
the data set is identical, this defence is a sophistry. 
Concerns arise also over method and technique. First, there is the issue of the number of 
participants and the nature of their participation. The authors state that 296 personnel were 
iŶǀolǀed iŶ ͚seŵi-stƌuĐtuƌed iŶteƌǀieǁs oƌ foĐus gƌoups͛, an impressive number, but examination of 
the data sources and sites (ibid: 2985-6) indicates that interviews were conducted only with senior 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt ;“Os oƌ HOsͿ oƌ ͚leaŶ eǆpeƌts͛ - with the exception of one trade union representative. 
As many as 230 research subjects were either at AA (Administrative Assistants), AO Administrative 
Officer or O (Officer) grades. When they deĐlaƌe that these gƌades ǁeƌe ͚iŶteƌǀieǁed iŶ foĐus 
gƌoups͛ (ibid: 2987), they are guilty of conflating quite different qualitative research methods. 
Second, no information is provided of the conditions in which the focus groups took place or how 
the participants were selected or volunteered. Third, at two sites front-line managers (Os) were 
͚ŵiǆed͛ ǁith ŶoŶ-supervisory grades (AOs and AAs), with unacknowledged consequences for the 
latteƌ͛s freedom of expression and confidentiality. Fourth, no information is provided of their 
approach to the analysis of the focus group data, a challenging undertaking given the different 
grades of employee involved, the number of focus groups (27) and the large number of participants 
(average 9 per group) for such a relatively short duration (45-60 minutes). Finally, difficulties emerge 
in the presentation of the evidence. On numerous occasions it is unclear to whom and to what grade 
the Ƌuotes aƌe attƌiďutaďle; foƌ eǆaŵple, ͚oŶe offiĐeƌ said͛ ;iďid: ϮϵϵϬͿ, ͚oŶe iŶteƌǀieǁee eǆpƌessed͛ 
;ϮϵϵϭͿ aŶd ͚a thiƌd eŵploǇee͛ said (ibid: 2991). The grade of the interviewee is not an immaterial 
consideration when interpreting the salience of their testimony.  
In the interests of equity and in order to frame our rebuttal, we explicate our research approach and 
summarise our methods. Although supported and given access by the Public and Commercial 
Services (PCS) union, this study was not initiated nor commissioned by them. A report was prepared 
for PCS, but we remained throughout the research and dissemination process unequivocally 
independent, to the point where published work has been quite ĐƌitiĐal of PC“͛s leadership (Carter et 
al, 2012). Within mainstream studies management perspectives are over-represented (Alvesson and 
Skoldberg, 2000) so, given the central objective of our research to examine perceptions and 
experiences of lean, employee survey responses and interview narratives were entirely appropriate. 
Consequently, our purpose was not to chase elusive and unattainable universal truths of lean but, 
committed to giving expression to the experiences and voices of the marginalised agents within the 
dominant discourse; we sought to ͚offset the unequal resources available to them compared to 
ŵaŶageƌs͛ (Brook and Darlington, 2013: 2136). This orientation does not render our research 
approach problematic nor mean that our evidential basis is narrow.  
The combination of qualitative (unstructured and semi-structured interviews) and quantitative 
methods (11-page questionnaire) delivered a data set of depth and breadth (840 completed surveys 
and 36 in-depth interviews) that permitted the thorough investigation of lean through the prism of 
front line agents. Other data sources (documentation, management interviews, HMRC sources) 
provide some triangulation. The detail of the method is best found in Carter et al, (2013b:752-5) and 
shows reflexivity on the strengths and limitations of worker-centred knowledge, retrospective recall, 
sample representativeness and the danger of bias
viii
. PƌoĐteƌ aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s principal line of criticism is 
that ouƌ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ is ͚alŵost eǆĐlusiǀelǇ Ŷegatiǀe͛ aŶd oŶe-sided iŶ ĐoŶtƌast to theiƌ ͚ŵoƌe 
ŶuaŶĐed alteƌŶatiǀe͛ ;ϮϬϭϰ: ϮϵϵϮͿ. As we demonstrate shortly, the conflict is not between our 
purported negativity and their claimed nuance, but difference based on the respective weight, status 
and transparency of evidence. Lest our alleged negativity might be seen as the outcome of a biased 
survey instrument, we emphasise how our questions were carefully constructed, including those 
using the Likert scale, to allow for a full range of possible answers.  
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The Weight of Evidence 
This section bridges methodological/epistemological considerations, on the one hand, and empirical 
concerns and the presentation of evidence on the other hand. A major issue for Procter and Radnor, 
to repeat, is our alleged negativity. It is true that our evidence of negative responses to lean does 
frequently involve significant, even overwhelming majorities. To provide some examples; 77 per cent 
reported that HMRC ͚does Ŷot listeŶ to Ǉouƌ suggestioŶs oŶ leaŶ͛; following lean only 5 per cent 
ƌepoƌted that theǇ ͚set [theiƌ] oǁŶ paĐe of ǁoƌk͛ eitheƌ ͚Ƌuite a lot͛ oƌ ͚a gƌeat deal͛, Đoŵpaƌed to ϳϴ 
per cent before lean; only 16 per cent before lean felt ͚quite͛ or ͚very pressurised͛ as a result of work 
oŶ a Ŷoƌŵal daǇ Đoŵpaƌed to ϵϱ peƌ ĐeŶt afteƌ leaŶ; the faĐtoƌs that ĐoŶtƌiďuted eitheƌ ͚a gƌeat deal͛ 
oƌ ͚to soŵe eǆteŶt͛ to the pressure were meeting individual targets (92 per cent), meeting team 
targets (90 per cent), keeping to SOPs (81 per cent), continuous workflow (70 per cent); almost four 
in five (89 per cent) reported that work intensity had iŶĐƌeased eitheƌ ͚a lot͛ oƌ a ͚little͛ afteƌ leaŶ; ϲϮ 
peƌ ĐeŶt ďelieǀed that ͚the skill ĐoŶteŶt of ǁoƌk͛ had deĐƌeased ͚a little͛ oƌ ͚a lot͛ afteƌ leaŶ (Carter et 
al, 2009). These emphatic findings are not a contrived negativity but are comprehensive evidence of 
ǁoƌkeƌs͛ geŶuiŶe antipathy towards lean during the process of its implementation and through 
experiences of lean working in the reconfigured organisation.   
In contrast, the reported evidence by Procter and Radnor is ambiguous, contradictory and often 
misleading. To give some examples: they state that ͚a number of front-liŶe staff….pointed to the 
Ŷegatiǀe ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes of͛ uŶdeƌtakiŶg detailed, post-lean, detailed task, data inputting  (2914: 
2988); theǇ Đlaiŵ that ͚some welcomed lean oŶ the ďasis that it gaǀe theŶ a gƌeateƌ stƌuĐtuƌe͛ (2014: 
ϮϵϵϮͿ͛; aŶd that ͚FoĐus gƌoups ƌefeƌƌed to iŵpƌoǀed ͞teaŵ spiƌit͛͟ (ibid: 2992). No indication is given 
of the relative weight of responses when mixed experiences or perceptions are reported. If a 
number of front-line staff were critical of the practice of fragmented data inputting and others were 
not, the real questions are how many were in each camp and how representative are the statements 
reported? If some welcomed the structural certainty lean provided, again, the question is how 
many? If, as indicated, focus groups reported improved team spirit, the questions prompted are how 
many focus groups, involving what grades and how many within these groups believed this 
improvement was the case?  It is not enough to assert that ͚the ďalaŶĐe ǁas ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh oŶ the 
positiǀe side͛ ƌegaƌdiŶg staff iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt in problem-solving (ibid: 2989) without demonstrating 
how the evidence stacks up.   
This argument against their methods stands even where they attempt to be more specific.  Their 
most substantive claim is that there were notable variations in the implementation and practice of 
Lean between local processing offices and district processing offices, on the one hand, and National 
Offices, on the other: 
The national processing centres . . . were able to use their respective unique positions 
as a means of retaining some control over how they did their work, which in turn 
encouraged a greater degree of involvement on the part of front-line staff (2990). 
 
This assessment appears to be based on the relative power of senior managers in the national 
centres, enabled through their control of unique areas of work, making it easier for them to shape 
aŶd deǀelop the “OPs, ƌatheƌ thaŶ haǀiŶg to ĐoŶfoƌŵ to aŶ eǆteƌŶallǇ iŵposed ŶatioŶǁide ďluepƌiŶt͛ 
(2990).  In effect Procter and Radnor͛s eǀideŶĐe ĐoŶflates the views of managers and those of 
workers.  Our data from one of the same national offices studied demonstrate neither significant 
difference fƌoŵ loĐal offiĐes iŶ leǀels of eŵploǇee iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt, Ŷoƌ iŶ ŵeasuƌes of ͚iŶdirect 
autoŶoŵǇ͛.  What diffeƌeŶĐe theƌe ǁas ďetǁeeŶ offices was negligible in comparison with the 
pronounced decline in measures of job quality. At the national offiĐe,  ͚fƌeƋueŶt͛ oƌ soŵetiŵes͛ help 
from team members reduced by 26% after the introduction of lean.  Moreover, while help declined 
the pressure exerted on each other rose from 13% to 52 after lean suggesting the transformation 
between members to harsher relations.  Job rotation similarly declined by 33%.  The reduction in the 
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use of expertise was even starker at 49%. Qualitative data similarly revealed no great difference in 
eǆpeƌieŶĐes.  OŶe eŵploǇee at the ŶatioŶal offiĐe desĐƌiďed the paƌaŵeteƌs of iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt: ͚Any 
ĐƌitiĐisŵ, it had to ďe … this Đaŵe fƌoŵ the LEAN ĐouŶĐil͛s ŵouth … ĐƌitiĐisŵ had to ďe positiǀe.  
Negatiǀe ĐƌitiĐisŵ had to ďe … had to haǀe a positiǀe spiŶ oŶ it͛ ;PC“ ďƌaŶĐh Đoŵŵittee ŵeŵďer).  
 
Teamworking at HMRC - A Tale of Two Case Studies or Two Tales of One Case Study 
‘adŶoƌ aŶd BuĐĐi͛s asseƌted that ͚teaŵǁoƌkiŶg [at HMRC] was generally acknowledged to be better 
under lean and there ǁas a ďetteƌ teaŵ spiƌit͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ: 7). That the evidential basis for this claim was 
questionable can be seen from a close reading of the report ďut also fƌoŵ ouƌ suƌǀeǇ͛s fiŶdiŶgs.  The 
responses to a four-item question (Carter et al, 2009) (Table 1) provide compelling evidence that 
following the introduction of lean employees believed that teams had less relevance regarding the 
locus of interdependence, task enlargement, multi-skilled and problem solving.  
First, there is a decline in the extent of reported collaboration and interdependence, as indicated by 
the 60 per cent of respondents who said they frequently received help from team members before 
lean, compared to the 26 per cent afteƌ leaŶ͛s iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ. Second, there is the constrained extent 
of job rotation. According to 70 per cent of respondents, task rotation which is one of the 
shibboleths of lean ͚fƌeƋueŶtlǇ͛ oƌ ͚soŵetiŵes͛ oĐĐuƌƌed before the introduction of lean, compared 
to 30 per cent who believed this was the case after lean. Third, and perhaps the most striking 
contrast is that between the 65 per cent of respondents who believed that, before lean, they 
͚fƌeƋueŶtlǇ͛ used theiƌ eǆpeƌtise aŶd ĐapaďilitǇ aŶd only 11 per cent thought that this was true in 
post-lean conditions. A mere 4 per cent considered that theǇ ͚haƌdlǇ eǀeƌ͛ oƌ ͚Ŷeǀeƌ͛ used theiƌ 
expertise and capability before lean, compared to 54 per cent who stated that this was the case 
after lean. Fourth, the evidence indicates the growth of peer group pressure; only 14 percent of 
respondents felt that they had been put under pressure by other team members to work harder 
before lean, a proportion that had grown to 54 per cent after lean.   
Table 1: Perceptions of Teamworking Before and After Lean (n=840) 
How frequently did/do you experience the following 
aspects of teamworking BEFORE and AFTER the 
introduction of lean?  
Frequently 
% 
Before    After 
Sometimes 
% 
Before   After 
Hardly Ever 
% 
Before       After 
Never 
% 
Before   After 
Help received from team members 60 26 34 46 5 25 1 8 
Task rotation in your team 33 11 38 19 17 35 10 34 
Use of my expertise and capability 65 11 31 34 3 36 1 18 
Pressure to work harder from other team members 2 18 12 36 38 21 47 21 
 
Now, it is not to present team working before lean as some white-collar idyllic craft, but it is to 
emphasise how the introduction of lean into HMRC resulted in a thoroughgoing restructuring of 
work organisation that transformed the job.  Prior to lean the tax officer undertook whole case 
working (Fisher, 2004) that saw the completion of a series of relatively standardised tasks certainly, 
ďut iŶǀolǀed joď ƌotatioŶ, task disĐƌetioŶ aŶd a degƌee of ͚ƌespoŶsiďle autoŶoŵǇ͛ (Friedman, 1977). 
Lean saw segmentation, standardisation and simplification of work processes through utilising 
classic Taylorist time and motion and the spatial reordering of work stations to minimise 
unnecessary worker motions and activity (Carter et al, 2011b). Its intention was to create a distinct 
breach or rupture with past traditions of work in an informal sense and in the more formal sense of 
͚the ǁaǇ that thiŶgs aƌe doŶe͛. 
Caƌteƌ et al͛s positioŶ is consistent. Not only does the weight of statistical evidence, based on a 
carefully formulated and rigorously analysed questionnaire, emphatically expose the work 
fragmentation, deskilling, excessive monitoring and work intensification that lean brought, so too 
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does abundant employee testimony deliver compelling first-hand insight. Space constraints prohibit 
more than the one rather lengthy quote:  
The use of hourly monitoring and whiteboards serve no purpose to management other than 
to apply pressure on staff to work harder. The unrealistic targets that management set are 
not based on valid timing exercises. They have produced higher targets without explanation. 
If any lean procedures are challenged or questioned by staff, then staff are accused of being 
negative. Daily meetings are basically a waste of time and do not add any value to staff or 
customers.  (Lothians, Administrative Officer) 
Reading Procter aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s article dispassionately, the striking conclusion is how little support 
they actually muster for their claimed balanced view of lean and how little evidence is marshalled to 
uŶdeƌŵiŶe Caƌteƌ et al͛s. OŶ the ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ, many of their quotes are quite consistent with our study. 
Notwithstanding their problem of scale and identification (how many and who) they observe (2014: 
2987) that ͚theƌe ǁas eǀideŶĐe of eŵploǇees feeliŶg that ǁoƌk had ďeĐoŵe fƌagŵeŶted aŶd 
degraded with employees responsible Ŷoǁ foƌ ͚oŶlǇ a paƌtiĐulaƌ paƌt of a [taǆ] ƌetuƌŶ͛. Another 
eŵploǇee ĐoŵplaiŶed, ͚Like eǀeƌǇoŶe else I feel I͛ǀe ďeeŶ deskilled͛ (ibid: 2988).  Relentless work 
pressure resulted from the cascading downwards of SOPs that remained impervious to workforce 
iŶflueŶĐe. With ƌegaƌd to suggested ĐhaŶges to uŶaĐĐeptaďle taƌgets, ͚EǀeŶ soŵe of those at OffiĐeƌ 
aŶd Higheƌ OffiĐeƌ Leǀel…eǆpƌessed fƌustƌatioŶ at the faĐt that theiƌ pƌoposals ǁeƌe Ŷot alǁaǇs put 
into effect͛. On the matter of the centrally driven SOPs, Procter and Radnor (ibid: 2989) state that 
theƌe ǁas ͚Ŷo ƌeal iŶput͛ iŶto hoǁ pƌoĐesses ǁeƌe iŵpleŵeŶted, Ǉet this a keǇ ŶotioŶ suŵŵoŶsed 
ďǇ theŵ iŶ faǀouƌ of ͚iŶdiƌeĐt autoŶoŵǇ͛.   
Nevertheless, Procter and Radnor attempt to ameliorate the negative representation of lean, but the 
continuous criticism of it throughout their article makes their defence Maginot-like in its 
effectiveness. Ultimately, they fall back on the justification that the reorganization of work 
associated with lean brought greater certaiŶtǇ; ͚staff Ŷoǁ had a ďetteƌ idea of ǁho theiƌ iŵŵediate 
colleagues were and, as a result, would discuss work with them much more than before…[a feeling] 
encouraged by the holding of daily team meetings and by the physical presence of team 
performance boards͛ (2104: 2990).  
This claim that inter-colleague communication was enhanced by lean is challenged by the evidence 
on time spent, post-lean, at the work station (Carter, 2013b: 759) whilst engaged in tasks. 
Remarkably, 48 per cent of respondents spent 95 per cent or more of their work time constantly 
engaged in tasks and a further 38 per cent spent between 85 per cent and 95 per cent. In these 
conditions of extremely reduced porosity of the working day, over and again respondents provided 
testimony of how they were no longer able to speak to work colleagues in formal (often problem-
solving ways) as they had been previously. Indeed, 35 per cent of those surveyed believed that now 
͚Ŷo tiŵe to talk to Đolleagues͛ ĐoŶtƌiďuted ͚a gƌeat deal͛ to the daily pressure of the job (ibid: 761). 
The replacement of this ongoing lateral engagement between colleague - that might be regarded as 
typical AWG behaviour - by formal, scheduled, team leader-led, team meetings that were dominated 
by targets and their achievement and underperformance, had the ironical effect of belittling genuine 
teamworking. Such developments call to mind a vivid early illustration of the displacement of AWGs 
by lean – or ͚Japanised͛ – teams. Taylor and Ramsay (1998) reported how at the ASDA supermarket 
women on the deli ĐouŶteƌ had ďeeŶ ͚autoŶoŵouslǇ ƌespoŶsiďle͛ foƌ all ŵaŶŶeƌ of ǁoƌk aĐtiǀities, 
from organising shifts to interchanging roles. Then the company introduced team briefs, daily target 
discussions, and structured procedures which curtailed interaction, leading one experienced worker 
to ĐoŵŵeŶt, ͚WheŶ theǇ ďƌought iŶ teaŵǁoƌkiŶg theǇ stopped us teaŵ ǁoƌkiŶg͛. Thus, it ǁas the 
case at HMRC.  
The additioŶal Đlaiŵ that PƌoĐteƌ aŶd ‘adŶoƌ ŵake, that the ͚phǇsiĐal pƌeseŶĐe of teaŵ peƌformance 
ďoaƌds͛ deepeŶed the feeliŶg aŶd aǁaƌeŶess of teaŵǁoƌkiŶg aŶd eŶhaŶĐed ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ, is 
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unsustainable. If a single aspect of the new regime of lean teamworking could be isolated as the 
symbol of all that was disliked, it would be the whiteboards and the hourly targets. As many as 54 
per cent of survey respondents (Carter et al, 2013b: 761) reported that the whiteboards contributed 
to a great extent towards pressure of work on a daily basis. More testimony was volunteered on this 
specific issue than any other and, it should noted, the removal of whiteboards became a central and 
popular union demand. Procter and Radnor even undermine the positive portrayal of teamworking 
ǁheŶ theǇ Ƌuote a fƌoŶt liŶe ǁoƌkeƌ saǇiŶg that ͚dailǇ ŵeetiŶgs aƌe a ǁaste of tiŵe aŶd ƌesouƌĐe͛ 
(2014: 2991). 
In sum, PƌoĐteƌ aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s eǀideŶĐe is stƌikiŶglǇ ĐoŶtƌadiĐtoƌǇ. They hark back to Procter and 
Cuƌƌie͛s ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϭϱϲϳ) narrow claim for teamworking that ͚it is eŵploǇees͛ ideŶtifiĐatioŶ ǁith theiƌ 
teaŵ͛s goal oƌ taƌget output, rather than their identification with their fellow team members, that 
pƌoǀides theiƌ ideŶtifiĐatioŶ ǁith the teaŵ͛ (1567).  Dubious in terms of conception and in relation to 
a body of critical literature, this assertion has even less substance when they set their ambiguous 
findings against the robust evidence of Caƌteƌ et al͛s.   
Government Sources  
Part of PƌoĐteƌ aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s (2014: 2983) case against us is to question the claims that our work is 
supported by evidence from official government sources. In fact, Procter and Radnor misrepresent 
our use of this evidence by incorrectly stating that the Civil Service People Survey (CSPS) is cited in 
Carter et al. (2013a). They confuse it with the Treasury Select Committee (2010), a cross-government 
staff survey that ranked HMRC as having the ͚most unhappy͛ workforce in the 53 departments 
surveyed. The Committee criticised HMRC for low morale and its Đultuƌe of ͚ĐoŵŵaŶd aŶd ĐoŶtƌol͛, 
in which many overstretched staff were facing burnout as management drove them ͚to go the eǆtƌa 
ŵile͛. 
Yet, the CSPS, which Procter and Radnor claim does not lend support to our work, reported that the 
HMRC had the 'least engaged' of any Civil Service workforce (2014: 2983) with its ͚eŵploǇee 
eŶgageŵeŶt iŶdeǆ͛ the lowest of any department (at 34% compared to a high of 72% and median of 
56%). They assert that ͚the situation is not so uniformly bleak as Carter et al suggest͛ ;ϮϬϭϰ: ϮϵϴϯͿ, 
because we ŶegleĐt sĐoƌes foƌ ͚ƌesouƌĐes aŶd ǁoƌkload͛, a category which iŶĐludes iteŵs oŶ ͚skills 
aŶd ǁoƌkload͛ aŶd ͚My teaŵ’. Now, we acknowledge that the survey indicates that some areas of 
work, although still below the Civil Service benchmark did show higher positive responses and, 
moreover, the high scores for questions for My Team might appear to indicate some support for 
teamworking. However, deconstructing the specific questions comprising the My Team composite 
ƌeǀeals poteŶtial eƌƌoƌs iŶ PƌoĐteƌ aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s ĐoŶĐlusioŶs. Wheƌe sĐores are high as, for example, 
in the response to ͚the people iŶ ŵǇ teaŵ ĐaŶ ďe ƌelied upoŶ to help ǁheŶ things get difficult in my 
job͛ (82 per cent) and ͚the people iŶ ŵǇ teaŵ ǁoƌk togetheƌ to fiŶd ǁaǇs to iŵprove the service we 
pƌoǀide͛ ;ϳϲ peƌ ĐeŶt), they reflect informal group and collegiate solidarity rather than technical 
questions of lean and teamworking. Further, responses resonate with employee commitment to the 
public sector ethos which is associated with opposition to lean working. 
The likelihood of group identification, as opposed to lean teamwork being the major influence on My 
Team scores is supported by results from two additional themes: work and line management. CSPS 
revealed that, while 72 per cent of respondents ͚agreed͛ or ͚strongly agreed͛ that they were 
interested in their work, the average of positive responses to My Work was 49 per cent, 22 
percentage points below the civil service benchmark. This figure was driven down by very low scores 
in HMRC oŶ ͚the amount of control͛ staff felt they had over their work. HMRC scored well below the 
civil service threshold. Further, only 28 per cent believed they were involved in decisions affecting 
theiƌ ǁoƌk, aŶ ͚iŶ-house͛ finding that in and of itself is quite damning of lean.  
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Despite ĐeŶsuƌe of the ͚ĐoŵŵaŶd aŶd ĐoŶtƌol͛ Đultuƌe ǁithiŶ the leaned HMRC (Treasury Select 
Committee, 2011), front line management are not the object of unmitigated hostility. Employees see 
them as willing to listen to employee ideas (70 per cent) and only 21 per cent were dissatisfied with 
the amount of respect they received from line managers. The latter percentage compares with the 
60 per cent dissatisfied with senior managers (Carter et al, 2014).  How do we make sense of this 
interesting distinction? The explanation may well lie in the depth and breadth of antagonism to work 
organisation in the lean environment, for which senior management are seen as responsible. In 
contrast, many front-line managers who, it must be remembered, are largely drawn from and have 
empathy with the ranks of the employees, were themselves deeply unhappy with the rationality of 
the lean changes and the roles that they had been forced to adopt (Carter et al, 2014). 
In sum, Procter and Radnor are unsuccessful in their attempt to eke out some positive message from 
these government reports and, simultaneously, fail to undermine our critical case against 
teaŵǁoƌkiŶg iŶ HM‘C͛s leaŶ. 
Conclusion 
HMRC constitutes perhaps the most important case study of lean working in the UK public sector, 
because it may be ͚the Đlosest of aŶǇ puďliĐ seƌǀiĐe oƌgaŶisatioŶ to date iŶ iŵpleŵeŶtiŶg the 
complete lean philosophy͛ (Radnor and Boaden, 2008: 2). What is remarkable about Procter and 
‘adŶoƌ͛s (2014) article is how unsuccessful it is in making a case for lean teamworking consistent 
with the original propositions of Womack et al (1990: 5). It should be remembered the latter had 
iŶsisted that, ͚IŶ the eŶd, it is the dǇŶaŵiĐ teaŵ that eŵeƌges at the heaƌt of the leaŶ faĐtoƌǇ͛ aŶd 
that ͚ǁoƌkeƌs Ŷeed to ďe taught a ǁide ǀaƌietǇ of skills so that tasks ĐaŶ ďe ƌotated͛ aŶd  ͚ŵust haǀe 
the aďilitǇ to thiŶk pƌoaĐtiǀelǇ to deǀise solutioŶs ďefoƌe pƌoďleŵs ďeĐoŵe seƌious͛.  
These virtuous characteristics of teamwork are notable by their absence iŶ HM‘C͛s ďaĐk offiĐe 
where downward cascades of tightly prescribed targets dictate claustrophobic monitoring and the 
hourly measurement of outputs and performance. Management measures performance, as 
elsewhere (Taylor, 2013), and disciplines those who fail to meet them. Procter aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s Đlaiŵs 
of ͚taƌget-ďased teaŵǁoƌk͛ aŶd ͚iŶdiƌeĐt autoŶoŵǇ͛ are not just conceptually flawed but empirically 
unsustainable, given that no real eǀideŶĐe is pƌoffeƌed of eŵploǇees͛ aďility to shape SOPs or to 
amend targets at HMRC. This conclusion should not come as a revelation to those familiar with the 
critical literature on lean and teamworking, from Lewchuk and Robertson (1997) to Stewart et al 
(2009), but which appears to have escaped the attentions of Procter and Radnor. It is impossible to 
ĐoŶĐeiǀe hoǁ ͚ƌespoŶsiďle autoŶoŵǇ͛ ;FƌiedŵaŶ, ϭϵϵϳͿ oƌ the Đhiŵeƌa of ͚iŶdiƌeĐt autoŶoŵǇ͛ Đould 
be realised iŶ suĐh a ͚laďouƌ ĐoŶstƌaiŶed͛ ŵaƌket eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt at HMRC in which, as Procter and 
Radnor concede ͚ǁoƌkeƌs should pƌoduĐe as ŵuĐh as theǇ ĐaŶ͛ (2014: 2993).  
We agree with Procter aŶd ‘adŶoƌ ǁheŶ theǇ desĐƌiďe ouƌ ƌeseaƌĐh as a ͚laƌgelǇ Ŷegatiǀe poƌtƌaǇal 
of LeaŶ͛;ϮϬϭϰ: ϮϵϳϵͿ, as ͚uŶeƋuiǀoĐallǇ͛ negative (op Đit: ϮϵϴϮͿ aŶd as aŶ ͚alŵost eǆĐlusiǀelǇ Ŷegatiǀe 
iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ͛ ;op Đit, ϮϵϵϮͿ. The ƌeasoŶs foƌ this ŶegatiǀitǇ do Ŷot lie in bias or weakness of method 
or interpretation, but are much more straightforward. The findings reflect the widespread and deep-
seated opposition of employees to teamworking under lean at HMRC. Certainly, we would have 
preferred not to have uncovered such an increasing immiseration of working lives, including the 
terrible associated problems of occupational ill-health (Carter, et al, 2013b), but the data compelled 
such a transparent and consistent interpretation. The specific weight of evidence iŶ Caƌteƌ et al͛s 
work does not signify one-sidedness or bias, nor does the mixture of positive and negative responses 
in Procter and Radnoƌ͛s aƌtiĐle indicate nuance.  
One of the curious aspects of Procter aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ aƌtiĐle is that its cautiously favourable 
evaluation of lean, in general, is not matched by much in the way of supporting evidence. Many of 
the illustrative quotes are quite critical. WiŶdiŶg the filŵ ďaĐkǁaƌds, ‘adŶoƌ aŶd BuĐĐi͛s ;ϮϬϬϳͿ 
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initial report on HMRC, based on the same dataset is, by way of contrast, much more positive about 
the outcome of Pacesetter, insisting that HMRC ǁas ͚ŵoǀiŶg iŶ the ƌight diƌeĐtioŶ͛ to become a lean 
organisation. Teamworking was claimed to be better under lean and team spirit much improved. 
Reference is made here and elsewhere to the ͚leaŶ jouƌŶeǇ͛, a teleologiĐal positiǀitǇ that 
aĐkŶoǁledged diffiĐulties oŶlǇ oŶ the gƌouŶds of ͚iŶĐoƌƌeĐt iŵpleŵeŶtatioŶ͛ oƌ ͚ǁoƌk iŶ pƌogƌess͛. 
“eddoŶ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ ĐƌitiĐised ‘adŶoƌ aŶd BuĐĐi ;ϮϬϬϳͿ foƌ failiŶg to adŵit to ͚deleteƌious effeĐts͛ foƌ 
employees.  
So a shift has taken place from the overt managerialism of the 2007 consulting report to the guarded 
criticism of the academic article of 2014. It appears as if Procter and Radnor now want to run with 
the hares and hunt with the hounds, to hedge their bets on whether lean can still become that 
͚sustainable͛ ͚ŵethodologǇ͛ to use two of their over-used words, or whether its damaging impact on 
both the experience and outcomes of labour and the accumulated weight of criticism will damage its 
usefulness for management. Managerial fads and fashions tend to have limited currency so that, in 
order to remain credible one-time promulgators and evangelists may evolve into critics. More 
ƌeĐeŶtlǇ, ‘adŶoƌ aŶd OsďoƌŶe ;ϮϬϭϯ: ϮϲϱͿ haǀe aƌgued that ͚the iŵpleŵeŶtatioŶ of leaŶ to date has 
ďeeŶ defeĐtiǀe͛. BizaƌƌelǇ, soŵe of ‘adŶoƌ͛s eaƌlieƌ Đo-authored work has been quoted critically in 
Procter aŶd ‘adŶoƌ͛s aƌtiĐle ;ϮϬϭϰ: ϮϵϴϭͿ; thus, ͚positive outcomes have been reported (e.g. Radnor 
aŶd BoadeŶ, ϮϬϬϴͿ ďut theǇ do Ŷeed to ďe looked at ǁith gƌeat ĐautioŶ͛. Noǁ this is not so much a 
rigorous auto-critique, as a chameleon-like shifting of position to blend in with a more critical 
zeitgeist.      
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i
 A striking example of this political-economic deficit is the failuƌe to ƌefeƌ to the Ŷeǁ Laďouƌ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s  
implementation of 10,500 job cuts at HMRC from 2004, to the appointment of Sir David Varney who embarked 
on a wholesale change pƌogƌaŵŵes iŶ ͚ŵiŵiĐƌǇ͛ of private sector values and disciplines. Nor is the decisive 
Gershon (2004) report mentioned.  
ii
 ‘adŶoƌ͛s ĐoŶsultaŶt ƌepoƌts ƌepeat WoŵaĐk aŶd JoŶes͛ distilled five core principles in a kind of ͚plug aŶd 
plaǇ͛ seĐtioŶ oŶ leaŶ͛s ďaĐkgƌouŶd ;e.g. ‘adŶoƌ et al, ϮϬϬϲ; ϴ-9; Radnor and Bucci, 2007: 67; Radnor and Bucci, 
2010:13). 
iii
 Procter and Radnor do not elaborate on the ways in which teams and teamworking are used by the Toyota 
Production System 
iv
 A ŵoƌe satisfaĐtoƌǇ ƋuestioŶ ŵight ďe foƌŵulated aloŶg these liŶes, ͚To ǁhat eǆteŶt aŶd iŶ ǁhat ǁaǇs do the 
teamworking practices and employee experiences of lean identified at HMRC, differ from or are consistent 
ǁith kŶoǁledge of teaŵs aŶd teaŵǁoƌkiŶg iŶ leaŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶts ďased oŶ tǁo deĐades of ƌeseaƌĐh? ͚. 
v
 Taking care not to misrepresent Procter and Radnor (2014), we do acknowledge that they refer to some 
limited work on lean (Conti and Warner, 1993; Benders and van Hootegem, 2000; Delbridge et al, 2000; Vidal, 
2007), but their review is truncated and largely unsatisfactory and incomplete. 
vi
 We aƌgue that iŶdiǀidual Đase ǁoƌkiŶg is aĐtuallǇ ŵoƌe Đoŵpatiďle ǁith ͚autoŶoŵous͛ teaŵǁoƌkiŶg than the 
fragmented, detailed work of the lean teams.     
vii
 ‘adŶoƌ aŶd BuĐĐi͛s eŶĐouƌageŵeŶt of positiǀe ǀieǁs should ďe seeŶ ǁithiŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ 
iŶdustƌial ƌelatioŶs. WheŶ ‘adŶoƌ aŶd BuĐĐi͛s ĐoŶduĐted theiƌ ƌeseaƌĐh ;JaŶuaƌǇ to JuŶe ϮϬϬϳͿ eŵployee and 
union (PCS) opposition to lean was so intense that it had already manifested itself in strike action in the 
Lothians (April 2006), backed by an overwhelming majority (80 per cent) of members, and was to produce 
national strike action.  
viii
 Such reflexive concerns are absent from Procter and Radnor. 
